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Managerialism has become increasingly incorporated into the practices of 
international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) in recent decades. To 
date, IPE has largely failed to examine how and why the managerial ethic has 
weaved itself into the fabric of prominent INGOs that have a stake in the global 
economy. The limited IPE literature that has addressed such activity has either 
cast such changes as part of a culture of professionalisation or as an outgrowth 
of neoliberalism. This article seeks to question these readings by directly 
dissecting how managerialism operates within a milieu which has been 
historically critical of capitalism. The argument is underpinned by conceptual 
insights from critical management studies, particularly how managerialism is 
associated with instrumental rationality and control. In relation to international 
development policy, the article examines the major macro institutional and 
ideological factors that have encouraged the spread of managerialism. To 
deepen our understanding of these trends, the article offers new empirics on 
the struggle over managerialism within Oxfam GB, from a limited imprint in the 
1980s to increasing normalisation from the early 2000s. The article calls for IPE 
to better unmask the internal politics of INGOs and, in turn, connect such 
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The spread of ideas associated with managerialism has become increasingly 
incorporated into the practices of international non-governmental organisations 
(INGOs) in the past three decades.1 Before the 1990s, major INGOs which had 
a concern for social and economic justice in the global economy tended to resist 
managerial knowledge and agendas. Today, similar to leading corporations, 
governments, and international organisations, many embrace strategic 
planning, performance monitoring, and stakeholderism, frameworks which 
carry a macro concern with instrumental rationality and control. But the 
evolution of managerialism in INGOs has generated an often intense debate 
around its progressive and regressive consequences. To date, IPE theorists 
have largely failed to examine how and why managerialism has weaved itself 
into the fabric of prominent INGOs that have a stake in the international 
economy. The limited IPE literature that has addressed such activity has either 
cast such changes as part of an expanding culture of professionalisation within 
global governance or treated it as an outgrowth of neoliberalism. This article 
seeks to question these readings by directly analysing how the managerial 
mindset operates within a milieu which has been historically critical of 
capitalism. In so doing, the argument explains not only macro patterns of 
ideological diffusion and the pathways through which managerial ideas have 
entered into large INGOs, but also how such analysis sheds new light on the 
wider logic of managerialism as a social technology of organisational control.2 
 
There now exists a substantive body of IPE scholarship which has explored 
how non-state, transnational entities have organised and mainstreamed their 
activities in the world economy. The number of NGOs has risen over the post-
Cold War period, with one estimate pointing to an increase from around 3000 
in 1990 to more than 8000 by 2010 (Union of International Associations 2010). 
Arguing that such actors are worthy of serious study, the rapid growth of INGOs 
during recent decades has been subsequently well documented, particularly in 
relation to the political economy of international organisations, regimes, and 
club forums (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Reimann 2006; Willetts 2011; Johnson 
2016; Quark 2016). Under the heading of ‘global civil society’, IPE theorists 
have both questioned the utility of such a conceptual category and empirically 
traced how INGOs deploy material and ideational resources to enhance their 
impact (Amoore and Langley 2004; Germain and Kenny 2005). In turn, these 
accounts have often been intertwined with normative debates around the 
potential of INGOs to ‘democratise’ or legitimise global economic governance 
(Scholte 2011; Bernstein 2011) or, via a neo-Gramscian perspective, to provide 
the seeds for counter-hegemonic movements (Cox 1999; Gill 2008).  
 
1 Any discussion of non-governmental organisations provokes definitional issues. The category 
of NGO is often contested and ill-determined. As commonly conceived, NGOs are viewed as 
being relatively autonomous from the state and business entities, although as I will explain, this 
aspect can be problematised. In this article, I do not seek to account for all potential groups 
that could be enveloped under the larger heading of NGO. Rather, my main focus involves a 
sub-category of international NGOs: established groups that have an interest in the political 
economy of international development.  
2 The meaning of ideology in this article departs from the frequently perceived reductionist 
Marxist sense of the ‘dominant ideology’, that is, a coherent ‘system’ which can be manipulated 
by Machiavellian elites. Instead, I prefer to reconsider ideology via a broader culturalist 
perspective, one that allows space for the everyday production and consumption of ideologies 
involving multiple actors. See Boltanski and Chiapello (2007); Freeden (1998). 
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In more recent literature, scholars have analysed INGOs in light of two larger 
frames of reference: professionalisation and neoliberalisation. In terms of the 
former, attention has been devoted to how INGOs have cultivated professional 
authority, particularly through the command of expert knowledge and morality-
driven arguments (Stroup and Wong 2017; see also Baillie Smith and Jenkins 
2011; Seabrooke and Henriksen 2017). For instance, in relation to trade 
politics, Kristen Hopewell (2015) has observed how some INGOs who target 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) nurture a professional ethos of behaviour 
and discourse which increasingly mirrors the practices of trade officials (also 
see Eagleton-Pierce 2018). Other analysts have been interested in specific 
instruments used by INGOs in their policy struggles, such as the role of 
benchmarks within the politics of quantification (Broome and Quirk 2015; 
Seabrooke and Wigan 2015). For some authors, these patterns of 
professionalisation can also be considered part of the so-called 
neoliberalisation of civil society. This viewpoint has attended to different 
concerns, but tends to centre around how INGOs adjust their policy positions 
to compete within a dominant orthodoxy which ‘makes sense’ to established 
institutions of power (Cooley and Ron 2002; Kamat 2004; Hannah 2014; 
Dauvergne and LeBaron 2014; Hopewell 2015).  
 
Within these IPE debates, however, an explicit focus on how large INGOs have 
encountered managerial theories or behavioural logics has been largely 
missing or, at best, approached in an oblique fashion. When referenced, 
managerialism tends to be used only as a descriptive term rather than an 
empirical object in its own right; that is, a phenomenon with particular practices. 
Thus, in addition to professionalism and neoliberalism, the notion of 
managerialism is often presumed to be synonymous with ‘marketisation’, 
‘bureaucratisation’, or to denote some ‘depolitical’ process. Even in Dauvergne 
and LeBaron’s (2014: 124-128) book-length study on the ‘corporatization of 
activism’, there is relatively little attention paid to ‘management culture’ in 
INGOs.3 In Dietrich’s (2016) comparative study of aid effectiveness involving 
non-state actors, New Public Management (NPM) agendas are noted, yet how 
such ideas shape the internal make-up of INGOs is not explored. One exception 
in the wider IR literature is Jutta Joachim and Andrea Schneiker’s (2018) 
research into how humanitarian INGOs act like businesses. They suggest that 
the appropriation of ‘firm-like’ attributes in INGOs entails a broader, yet 
nuanced, shift in ‘mind-set’ within such groups, one that does not proceed in a 
uniform manner from the ‘corporate model’. Rather, which managerial theories 
and capacities are learnt, how they are internally tailored and construed, and 
what material implications are generated are all open questions which cannot 
be easily assumed in advance.  
 
My argument in this article dovetails with some of the themes developed by 
Joachim and Schneiker (2018), but it also takes inspiration from how other 
fields of scholarship have dissected both the nature of managerialism and the 
particular ways in which managerial practices have become part of the activities 
 
3 Nevertheless, the study does feature attention to a number of themes that could be viewed 
as tied to a managerial vision, including NGO partnerships with major corporations, fair trade 
consumption, and arguments around the delimiting of radical activism. 
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of major INGOs. I suggest that conversations in these areas are directly 
relevant for how IPE can grasp the forms and uneven material effects of 
managerialism on multiple actors within the world economy. At a theoretical 
level, this article draws upon insights from critical management studies as a 
productive literature which, since the 1980s, has explored some of the core 
ideologies and working methods that encompass managerialism. My argument 
seeks to probe, in particular, enduring problems around rationality, 
performance, and control within organisations and how such issues manifest 
themselves in INGOs (Clegg 1981; Reed 1989; Grey 1996, 2017; Townley 
2002, 2008). With reference to the empirical heart of my argument, I also deploy 
insights found within development studies, specifically the field of ‘development 
management’, along with other analysis drawn from voluntary sector studies 
(Dichter 1989; Thomas 1996, 1999; Dart 2004; Roberts, Jones, and Fröhling 
2005; Brinkerhoff 2008; Dar and Cooke 2008; Hvenmark 2016). Here, I seek to 
understand not only how managerialism has shaped the public agendas issued 
by INGOs, but also how such changes have been internally understood by 
those agents who create, enable, adapt, and contest managerial reason.  
 
Hence, this article also contributes to two larger debates in IPE. First, as noted, 
through exploring major features of managerialism, it enriches the longstanding 
study of dominant ideas and practices in the world economy. For those who 
explore either the political economy of professionalism or neoliberalism, the 
study of managerialism shares some overlaps, such as around the analysis of 
expertise and the role of business as a laboratory for thinking concerning wider 
organisational behaviour. However, in keeping with this special issue, I concur 
with Knafo et al. (2019) that managerialism carries its own particular historical 
legacies and, moreover, should be treated as an adaptable set of social 
technologies that are appropriated for a range of governing purposes. Second, 
this article problematises a structuralist tendency in IPE to read major INGOs 
as players who reflect larger systems of power, notably with respect to the ties 
of collaboration or coercion with the state (see also Stroup and Wong 2017). 
As I will explain when discussing the power of managerialism, this perspective 
is certainly needed for deciphering how INGOs are constrained or enabled 
through webs of material and ideational relations. But too often INGOs are still 
depicted as stylised abstractions, with little attention devoted not only to the 
extraordinary diversity of such groups but also, in particular, to how politics are 
actually conducted and contested behind the scenes. This article therefore 
seeks to complement the structuralist perspective with a micro-level tracing of 
the managerial footprint in a particular INGO, a process that will explain more 
precisely how and why managerialism has taken hold. 
 
The argument is organised into three main sections. First, through engaging 
with the literature in critical management studies, I discuss a particular definition 
of managerialism which will serve to guide and inform the entire argument. 
Second, I turn to address the empirical context of the political economy of 
international development and debate why major INGOs have reshaped 
themselves through managerial logics. Since the 1980s, these reasons pivot 
around indigenous institutional growth aims, funding conditionality demands 
from leading donors, along with wider cultural and political trends. Evidence 
here is largely drawn from major INGOs which have an established UK base or 
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centre of activity, such as CAFOD, Christian Aid, Save the Children, or the Red 
Cross. The third and longer section goes inside this field to uncover the 
workings of managerialism in the particular case of Oxfam GB. Due to Oxfam’s 
size and internal contests over managerial ideas, which have a historical legacy 
over several decades, I argue that it makes for a valuable object of examination. 
I first explore how managerial concepts and practices gradually entered the 
organisation, from embryonic forms in the 1980s and 1990s to mature practices 
in the early decades of this century. I focus on the development of Oxfam’s 
agenda around monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL) as a revealing 
instance of managerialism in a major INGO. Through applying the insights 
derived from the conceptual discussion, the aim of this case study is to uncover 
more precisely how the managerial ethic has been at once legitimised and 
contested as a form of governance. In turn, I argue in the process how the 
category of managerialism offers a more precise vehicle for explaining these 
changes, particularly when compared to the notion of neoliberalism. 
 
 
1.  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
As argued in the Introduction to this special issue (Eagleton-Pierce and Knafo), 
the larger concept of managerialism points to the processes through which 
management ideas and practices spread across space and time. In this article, 
drawing upon insights from critical management studies, I anchor the 
discussion around two larger themes. First, as many scholars have argued, 
managerialism encompasses models and ideals which carry a Weberian 
imprint of instrumental rationality (Edwards 1980; Watson 1994). Instrumental 
rationality emphasises calculation, deliberateness, and predictability in order to 
formulate the most efficient relationship between means and end (Weber 
2013[1922]). Whether this efficiency is actually accomplished is an empirical 
question, but the ideological consistency of seeking efficiency is a hallmark of 
the managerial mindset. In practice, managerialism will often experiment with 
value or substantive rationality; that is, not simply a single goal, but a range of 
ethical justifications for inspiring commitment (for instance, ecological 
sustainability) (Weber 2013[1922]). As explored in the case study, instrumental 
and value rationalities are frequently combined in various ways, although the 
former arguably has a more dominant weight. Second, the concept of 
managerialism also implies one of the central preoccupations in management 
practice: the problem of control (Clegg 1981; Beniger 1989; Chau, Lowe, and 
Puxty 1989; Reed 1989; Otley, Broadbent, and Berry 1995; Berry et al. 2009). 
We should not assume that the declared aspiration for control, on the part of 
those who can exercise power, will be effective. Protests, miscalculations, 
accidents, and mundane ignorance inevitability blur the deceptively straight 
lines of managerial reason. Such patterns may even be acknowledged by 
relevant parties, and can be accompanied by skepticism and cynicism, but the 
need to be seen to be in control, at the very least, serves as a powerful 
underlying motivation for reproducing managerialism (Grey 2002).  
 
These core modalities of managerialism are reproduced via a wide range of 
theories and practices found in institutional environments. One area of 
relevance for my enquiry here centres on debates tied to ‘performance 
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management’ or ‘results-based management’. As a concept associated with 
rationalised monitoring, performance management emerged in the 1970s, first 
in relation to the targeted, behavioural intervention of workers in firms, before 
gradually expanding to embrace larger institutional questions on efficiency, 
accountability, and ‘quality of service’. Performance management is a vague 
reference, but tends to direct thinking towards organisational objectives, the 
means for measuring goal attainment, and how such activity relates to wider 
strategic visions (Townley 1993; Otley 1999; Ferreira and Otley 2009). In an 
effort to represent and intervene legitimately in such processes, policies of 
performance management often involve the production of statistical indicators, 
targets, benchmarks, and audits. The related notion of results-based 
management (RBM) has echoes of earlier ideas, notably Peter Drucker’s 
(2011[1954]) influential ‘management by objectives’ model which captured the 
ear of corporate elites in the 1960s and 1970s. As a contemporary framework, 
RBM began to be adopted from the 1990s, particularly by governments, 
international organisations, and charities. As I will explain, similar to 
performance management, RBM is inherently coloured by the core features of 
managerialism, notably assumptions and desires for control, along with linear 
patterns of reasoning and a focus on outcomes. 
 
How can this conceptual framework on managerialism be compared to the 
larger study of neoliberalism in IPE and related fields? Depending upon how 
one defines neoliberalism this question invites multiple readings (Eagleton-
Pierce 2016). For instance, Hanlon (2018) argues that neoliberal intellectual 
thought and management theory share comparable features around the pursuit 
of competition and elite-led leadership. From this perspective, management is 
‘a central neoliberal tool’, one which is opposed to alternative modes of 
democracy (Hanlon 2018: 300). Other authors, including Linsi (2019) in this 
special issue, have examined how the related narrative of competitiveness – 
viewed by many to be a classic feature of neoliberal policy rhetoric – was 
inspired by Michael Porter’s (1990) efforts to develop business-like strategies 
for entire countries. Closer to my interest in managerialism in the field of 
development policy, a range of critics have noted how the turn to New Public 
Management (NPM) from the 1980s can be framed in light of neoliberal trends. 
While the core of NPM has remained rather ambiguous, it broadly constitutes 
an amalgamation of ideas drawn from corporate management, institutional 
economics, and public choice (Pollitt 1993; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). 
According to its advocates, governments are assumed to be suffering from a 
‘performance deficit’ (Kamensky 1996: 249) by trying to maintain the quality of 
public services yet, at the same time, relieve the burden on taxpayers and 
enhance democratic accountability. Managerial ideas were seen as an 
inspiration for how efficiency savings could be realised, along with importing 
models of customer satisfaction and choice. In this sense, therefore, the 
ideology of managerialism is depicted by some commentators as the 
‘organisational glue’ for holding together wider neoliberal rationalities across 
different institutional spaces (Clarke and Newman 1997). 
 
At the same time, however, there are risks in conceptually fusing 
managerialism with neoliberalism. One major distinction concerns how 
managerialism is a form of governance which does not always require a profit 
	 7	
or market making activity. Some of the primary empirical concerns in the study 
of neoliberalism, such as the politics of privatisation, financialisation, or trade 
liberalisation, may be reproduced through certain managerial practices, but this 
does not exhaust all possible expressions of the managerial ethic. Rather, 
concurring with Knafo et al. (2019), I view managerialism as a set of malleable 
social technologies which are open-ended with respect to the institutional site 
and telos. In this sense, therefore, I suggest that managerialism cannot always 
be neatly encapsulated under what is commonly viewed as a neoliberal 
commodification process. This is not to suggest that dominant diffusional 
pathways in ideas are not observed, such as from the corporate space to 
governments and onwards to INGOs. Rather, my aim here is to uncover how 
managerial practices are, in the deepest sense, concerned with wider struggles 
over organisational design and the dispositional conduct of individuals. At the 
same time, the focus on managerialism also sharpens the analytical attention 
around particular actors that are associated with the reproduction of such 
knowledge, such as consultancies, business schools, and management 
theorists. For sure, one could deploy the catch-all frame of neoliberalism to 
analyze these latter groups, but managerialism is arguably a more precise 
reference point. Tracing how these groups and other forces have made their 
mark on the political economy of global development, and the operations of 
major INGOs in particular, is now the concern of the next section.  
 
 
2.  MANAGERIALISM AND INGOs IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF  
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
 
Since the mid-1980s, ideas and practices associated with managerialism have 
become increasingly prominent in large INGOs that have a stake in the political 
economy of international development. As explained in the introduction, this 
important trend has largely bypassed IPE scholarship, yet has been explored 
in adjacent fields. This has resulted in different terms to summarise such 
tendencies, including the notion of INGOs becoming ‘business-like’, 
‘corporatised’, ‘marketised’, or ‘hybrid’. In development studies, these debates 
have clustered around the area of development management (Dichter 1989; 
Thomas 1996, 1999; Roberts, Jones, and Fröhling 2005; Brinkerhoff 2008; Dar 
and Cooke 2008; Gulrajani 2010), along with others who have discussed similar 
themes in voluntary sector studies (Dart 2004; Hvenmark 2016). Not 
surprisingly, a range of normative claims have surfaced within these debates, 
from relatively neutral, ‘reformist’ positions to more ‘radical’ critiques that argue 
INGOs which adopt managerialism blunt their mission of social justice in the 
world economy. As a way to provide the wider empirical context for the 
subsequent Oxfam case study, I offer here three reasons for why 
managerialism has become more common in INGOs concerned with 
international development. These factors revolve around: (1) an aspiration for 
organisational growth and internal improvement; (2) the influence of ideas and 
agendas from leading donors; and (3) wider political and societal trends. In 
practice, all these reasons are interrelated and it can be difficult determining 
which is more important at any point in time. I plot these historical patterns in 
relation to major INGOs that have an established UK presence, such as 
CAFOD, Christian Aid, and the Red Cross. 
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Considering the first theme, from the mid-1980s, in the wake of the Cambodian 
and Ethiopian humanitarian crises, many of these INGOs developed a greater 
public profile and, consequently, a motivation to expand operations and 
maintain growth. For example, from 1984 to 1986, the combined income of 
seven of the largest UK-based development INGOs almost doubled to £390 
million, before later peaking at nearly £1 billion in 2006 (see Figure 1). As many 
have noted, this period marked the ‘ascent of the big-budget NGO’ (Dauvergne 
and LeBaron 2014: 111). Growth in organisational complexity and rising 
expectations inevitably prompted debates on how to improve working practices, 
particularly when there appeared to be a gap between the aspiration 
surrounding INGO goals and the actual capacity to realise such objectives 
(Dichter 1989; Thomas 1996, 1999; Wallace 1997). Some critics argued that 
INGOs needed to prioritise ‘nuts-and-bolts’ management skills in order to 
enable more effective development policy impacts, such as basic planning 
around budgeting and personnel (Dichter 1989: 381). As part of this process, 
there were related aspirations around how to professionalise fundraising, 
marketing, and research in ways that would enhance efficiency (Wallace 1997). 
The turn to professionalisation was accompanied by higher education providers 
offering related degrees.4 Although managerial thinking in such entities was still 
tentative from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, large INGOs were beginning to 
experiment with certain ideas, particularly around strategic planning and 
initiatives under project management (Korten 1990; Smillie 1995; Wallace with 
Bornstein and Chapman 2007). 
 
 
Figure 1: Income of selected international development organisations with UK 
presence, 1970-2009 (adjusted for inflation, 2009). Derived from annual reports 
and accounts, organisations concerned; Charity Statistics (various years). 
Source: Hilton et al. (2012): 49.  
 
4 In 1995, the London School of Economics established an MSc in NGO Management. In 1996, 




This incorporation of managerialism into INGOs cannot be adequately 
understood without situating such actors in light of the broader history of the 
development industry. As suggested, since managerialism is embedded in the 
episteme of rational modernity, it is not surprising to find connecting threads of 
meaning dating back to the 1950s or even earlier (Escobar 1995; Cooke 2003). 
For instance, the field of ‘development administration’, prominent in the early 
post-WWII decades, drew inspiration from the management theories of 
Frederick Taylor and Henri Fayol, before later adopting insights from the 
planning, programming, and budgeting (PPB) approach advocated by the US 
government (Gant 1979; Krause 2014). In 1969, in a move that would have 
lasting effects on the mainstreaming of managerialism, the logical framework 
analysis (LFA or logframe) was created by a management consultancy firm for 
the US Agency for International Development (USAID). As argued by 
Jacqueline Best (2014: 169), the logframe should be read as part of the 
ideational roots of the now dominant ‘measuring results’ donor agenda, a 
device which has been widely utilised by multilateral donor agencies and, from 
the 1990s, INGOs. As a tool of performance management, it initially grew in 
response to popular and Congressional criticism of alleged misspending in aid 
projects. Via a 4x4 matrix, the logframe places an emphasis on how agencies 
should link efforts with outputs, including a need to find ‘objectively verifiable 
indicators’ and the ‘means of verification’ (Krause 2014). Elsewhere, from the 
mid-1970s, the formation of monitoring and evaluation (M&A) units in the World 
Bank, the UN, and the OECD emerged in reaction to similar criticism around 
perceived implementation failures in aid policies and the need for tighter 
controls. By the early 2000s, M&A was firmly embedded in such institutions, 
with a focus on both the internal and external functioning of organisations, and 
often enveloped under the larger category of ‘results-based management’ 
(UNDP Evaluation Office 2002; Kusek and Rist 2004). 
 
The normalisation of results-based management in development policymaking 
also needs to be seen in relation to the aforementioned turn to NPM and the 
neoliberal reconfiguration of the state. Within these changes, of which the UK 
was a test case, a major shift involved recasting large INGOs as 
accommodating and supposedly ‘non-ideological’ service delivery partners with 
the state, rather than oppositional social forces (Edwards and Hulme 1996; 
Stroup 2012; Hilton et al. 2013). Compared to government, INGOs were often 
depicted in these contexts as legitimate implementers of aid projects, with 
better grassroots knowledge and the ability to embrace participatory forms of 
engagement (Edwards and Hulme 1996). When such INGOs began to derive 
a rising share of their income from government sources, these relations 
became even more entangled.5 From 1983 to 1994, UK government funds to 
INGOs increased by almost 400 per cent to around £69 million.6 With the 
establishment of the Department for International Development (DFID) in 1997, 
financing has tended to favour the big players, such as Oxfam, Save the 
 
5 For UK-registered development INGOs, other major institutional donor funding sources 
beyond DFID have included the EU, Comic Relief, and other European governments. 
6 From 1970 to 1997, the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) was the main agency 
for UK policy on international development, formally located under the Foreign Office. 
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Children, and Christian Aid (Wallace with Bornstein and Chapman 2007). From 
2000 to 2016, this special treatment given to the major INGOs was cemented 
through a new mechanism, Programme Partnership Agreements (PPAs), a 
scheme which encouraged long-term, deeper cooperation between DFID and 
INGOs. From 2011 to 2016, PPAs committed £673 million to fund INGO 
projects.7 In return for this funding, INGOs tended to deploy the language of 
NPM used by DFID, particularly around ‘value for money’, ‘performance 
indicators’, ‘delivering goods and services effectively and efficiently’, and 
‘rigorous reporting’. At the same time, the logframe became an essential 
instrument and no PPA application was complete without it (Wallace with 
Bornstein and Chapman 2007). 
 
A third theme of significance involves the wider social context in which 
managerialism appears as a potential solution (or foil) to accountability 
problems. It is often assumed that accountability is a normatively good value 
and, thus, the more accountability the better. But INGOs in the development 
space have long been vulnerable to criticism regarding whom they speak for 
and how such accountability should be measured and enhanced (Jagadananda 
and Brown 2010). From the 1990s, as they became larger entities and received 
more official funding, these criticisms became frequent and at times acute. 
INGOs are often caught in a pincer movement to respond to multiple 
accountabilities: ‘downwards’ to staff, supporters, and potential ‘beneficiaries’; 
and ‘upwards’ to donors, trustees, auditors, and government authorities 
(Edwards and Hulme 1996; Jordan and van Tuijl 2006; Lewis 2007). These 
pressures involved INGOs tending to centralise management, such as with 
boards and executive teams, along with making appeals to the language of 
transparency (Dauvergne and LeBaron 2014). Again, this shift needs to be 
understood in relation to wider trends, notably the ‘good governance’ agendas 
emanating from the World Bank and IMF (Soederberg 2001, 2005). In the UK, 
the particular role of the right-wing media has added a further layer of concern, 
with such outlets often constructing a narrative of suspicion around INGOs, 
including disputing the need for aid money or exposing abuse allegations, the 
latter of which rocked the sector in 2018.8 When faced with these charges, the 
abstract managerial reflex tends to be activated. As I have suggested, 
managerial knowledge is attractive when it appears to show to others a capacity 
for control, including in this context the ability to plot the chains of delegation 
which connect responsibility for a particular project with a wider network of 
relations. Again, the vocabulary and entire presentation of abstract 
managerialism – a ‘disembodied and disembedded’ model that can be 
seemingly applied to all contexts (Townley 2002: 550) – appeals to a modern 
sensibility. 
 
But once embedded within the culture of an NGO, complete with its own cadre 
of experts and supporters, I would argue that managerial knowledge is not 
 
7 For the data, see DFID, ‘Programme Partnership Arrangements (PPAs); Guidance’: 
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/programme-partnership-arrangements-ppas. In 2016, PPAs 
were terminated. 
8 For instance, among countless stories which could be cited, see Martin, D., ‘Charities 
Including Oxfam Are Accused of Campaigning for Higher Levels of Foreign Aid “For Their Own 
Benefit”’, Daily Mail, April 15, 2016. 
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merely a reaction to these problems, but a contributing cause which further 
fuels anxiety over accountability deficits. In one sense, this cycle results from a 
common criticism: managerialism often struggles to shape behaviour in 
alignment with its promoted blueprint. The ‘human element’ will inevitably 
evade, mask, or only partially reveal itself to the gaze of accountability. Among 
complications, there may be confusion or bias over which ‘stakeholders’ to 
privilege; divergences between ‘local understandings’ in the field and central 
reporting; and contortions around data collection and analysis, notably with 
respect to intangible knowledge or simply unknown details (Koppell 2005; 
Wallace with Bornstein and Chapman 2007; Roche 2015). Such issues are 
certainly debated within INGOs, but what often emerges is a reformist attitude 
to complicate existing frameworks – to make ‘better’ accountability measures 
and to recast disappointments as ‘failing forwards’ – rather than holistically 
decipher how the wider social system, with its internal contradictions, is 
reproducing particular expectations of comportment. As Roche (2015: 92) 
argues, development INGOs ‘seem to behave as if they can meet more onerous 
results reporting and value for money demands placed upon them and promote 
transformational development’. Thus, to recall the conceptual discussion, I 
would argue that managerialism encourages this attitude that organisational 
manageability is fundamentally possible, desirable, and expandable; the idea 
of an unmanageable world does not cross its ideological radar. 
 
It could be suggested, therefore, that the incorporation of managerial 
technologies into the field of global development policy was overdetermined 
and, certainly by the late 1990s, carried a sense of inevitability. However, as 
hinted at, within the social world of activism there have always been 
expressions of dissent. As a way to segue to the case study, some criticisms 
can be highlighted (Lewis 2008). First, since many individuals who work in 
INGOs express a normative desire for ‘alternative worlds’ which are beyond 
prevailing orthodoxies, managerialism – with its historical ties to capitalist 
enterprises and the bureaucratic state – can often appear as the antithesis. 
Others have argued that managerialism should be rejected because it 
represents an ideology of Western rule, one which has linkages to patterns of 
(neo)colonial domination (Dar and Cooke 2008; Girei 2016). Second, many 
development activists share a dispositional identity towards action and socio-
economic change. Getting out of the office, into the field, and furthering the 
cause of justice represents, for many, the raison d’être of the activist life. By 
contrast, the managerial orientation – with its primary propensity to see 
relations through instrumental rationality and what is efficient rather than what 
is morally right – is read by some as a conservative and tainted belief system 
(Chambers 1986, 1993). A third and related criticism concerns the view that 
money should not be (excessively) spent on administration but, rather, directed 
towards the poor. This notion is found not only among activists who may doubt 
the worth of managerialism, but also among thinkers on the political right. In 
short, these themes help to shed light on how the turn to managerialism in the 
political economy of development is not only the product of many sources, but 
has been, and continues to be, contested as a idea and practice. 
 
 
3. CASE STUDY: OXFAM AND THE TURN TO MANAGERIALISM 
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How has managerialism shaped Oxfam and what critiques have been provoked 
by such processes? In this final section, I return to the core modalities of 
managerialism, including the perennial concern with rationality and control, in 
order to better explore this question. The choice of Oxfam was informed by two 
core reasons. First, it is a powerful actor in the NGO sector and has 
demonstrated a history of experimentation with managerial ideas and agendas, 
to the extent that the group has arguably helped to consolidate such practices 
in relation to other major INGOs in the development space. Second, with the 
opening of the Oxfam archives, one can now better uncover the internal 
struggles over managerial notions and forms of behaviour. There are many 
potential illustrations of managerialism in Oxfam which could be examined, 
such as partnerships with the private sector or the particular role of senior 
managers. In the discussion here, however, I have chosen to concentrate on 
the emergence, and later solidification, of agendas around monitoring, 
evaluation, and learning (MEL) within Oxfam GB.9 As an initial definition, MEL 
is a set of activities concerned with how organisations define, measure, and 
assess their work, with a view to promoting effectiveness, accountability, and 
understanding.10 I argue here that the case of MEL is a pertinent example of 
how managerial reason has found its way into major INGOs, reshaping 
expectations and forms of conduct in ways that are both progressive and 
regressive. Empirical objects which have received the MEL treatment at Oxfam 
GB have included many areas associated with the global political economy, 
such as projects on trade policy, gender, and climate change.11  
 
The argument first uncovers a period from the late 1980s to the late 1990s 
which, I suggest, represents a phase of embryonic managerialism when such 
ideas were increasingly debated. The current period, from the early-2000s, can 
be summarised as mature managerialism, involving a more complex 
institutionalisation and normalisation of MEL within Oxfam GB, as well as the 
wider NGO field. In charting this history, I showcase the processes through 
which managerialism acquired legitimacy within a social world which historically 
ignored such notions. This movement – from internally viewing MEL as 
something that would be ‘nice to do’ to ‘fundamental’ or even ‘existential’ to 
Oxfam GB – reveals some of the broader effects of managerialism as a 
powerful governing ideology. In the spirit of Weber, I also seek to open up a 
discussion on the tensions between instrumental and value forms of rationality 
in how MEL has been conceived, along with more substantive critiques of the 
entire shift to managerial thinking. In keeping with the macro contribution to IPE 
outlined in the introduction, this account therefore seeks to reveal the internal 
 
9 Prior to 1995, a year when Oxfam International was established as an overarching secretariat 
body, the group was comprised of 12 largely autonomous, nationally-focused affiliates. As of 
2019, there are now 19 affiliates. See https://www.oxfam.org/en/our-governance. My focus in 
this article is on Oxfam GB, although at different points I note relations with Oxfam International. 
10 In Oxfam GB, as well as in other UK INGOs (such as Save the Children), the category of 
MEL has also been complemented by an extension: MEAL, which stands for monitoring, 
evaluation, accountability, and learning. I will refer to MEL in this article because it is the most 
commonly used concept. 




politics of a particular INGO in order to construct an agential analysis which 
complements, and enriches, our understanding of the structural explanations 
discussed in the second section.   
 
This research is founded upon three sets of sources. First, 20 interviews were 
conducted with representatives from Oxfam GB, both past and present, who 
have played a role in the development of MEL (including MEL-dedicated 
professionals, advocacy staff, and senior managers). In addition, outside 
Oxfam GB, a small number of other consultants and researchers were also 
interviewed. Second, the Oxfam Archives, housed at the Weston Library at the 
University of Oxford, were researched for relevant data. This process included 
retrieving internal communications, reports, and other documents, many of 
which have yet to be subjected to academic examination. Third, the existing 
secondary literature, where relevant, was incorporated into the analysis. 
 
Embryonic managerialism  
 
From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, Oxfam GB was confronted with a rapidly 
changing and often confusing external context, notably in respect to the end of 
the Cold War but also increased scrutiny by the Conservative government on 
spending and political activity (Black 1992; Hilton et al. 2013). In particular, 
following the Charity Commission Inquiry in 1991, where Oxfam GB was 
criticised for being overly political, there was an intense spotlight on the 
organisation (Burnell 1992). Internally, amidst staff upheaval, there were efforts 
to improve how the group defined and conducted its activities. During this 
period, one saw tentative steps, largely guided by a few voices rather than 
representing any kind of organised initiative from senior figures, to develop 
agendas around greater monitoring and evaluation.12 In private 
communications, the reasons given for such activity are rather abstract, 
aspirational, and partial, often without reference to the particular agents or 
issues which may have questioned the legitimacy of Oxfam GB. Reports speak 
of the need ‘to do what we do better’13, within an environment which features 
increasing demands for accountability, competition for financing, and the 
‘pressure to show positive results’.14 On the basis of cost and efficiency 
concerns, there was a call for more systematic planning and appraisal across 
the group, rather than one-off, ‘snapshot’ evaluation reviews.  
 
By the early 1990s, the appeal to strategic planning was beginning to resonate, 
particularly at senior management levels. Monitoring and evaluation activity 
was housed within this larger frame. An important stimulus to these debates 
was provided by Compass, a consultancy firm hired by Oxfam GB to provide 
advice on how to restructure the organisation, recommendations which were 
 
12 The acronym of MEL was not used during this time and only entered circulation from the late 
1990s. 
13 Frances Rubin and Hugh Goyder, ‘Proposals for an Oxfam Policy on Monitoring and 
Evaluation’, May 1990, 7 (PRG/8/3/7/9, Oxfam Archive, Weston Library, University of Oxford). 
14 Hugh Goyder, ‘Monitoring and Evaulation: Policy and Suggested Practice’, November 1987, 
1. (PRG/8/3/7/9, Oxfam Archive, Weston Library, University of Oxford). 
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later endorsed by the Trustees.15 In a subsequent and revealing internal review 
of the Compass experience and worldview, there was recognition that change 
was needed in Oxfam GB: 
 
‘There is a real and urgent need to improve and increase 
the monitoring, reporting and evaulation work at all levels 
in Oxfam. Strategic planning highlights the essential need 
to draw on past experiences and to have information 
about impact, successes and failures. Without this staff 
are writing plans on the basis of individual judgement or 
opinion, not on a more objective set of data…’16 
 
In this document, there was an acknowledgement that Compass was calling for 
a ‘style of management [that] required a major break with past practices’, one 
where ‘accountability, learning from experience, and measuring performance 
are central’.17 It was anticipated that this would require developing better 
indicators to ‘rigorously’ measure impact, the increased use of quantitative 
methods, along with more systematic efforts to prioritise what Oxfam GB could 
feasibly accomplish within its resources. These proposals, however, 
immediately faced criticism. The review speaks of how ‘many staff were 
unhappy with the imposition of these [management] concepts’, which were 
seen as ‘potentially in conflict with much past ideology and practice in Oxfam’.18 
Instead, such critics argued that the organisation needed to remain ambitious, 
reactive, and field-led in its activity, without being burdened by systems of 
accountability that were deemed to be ‘unnecessarily heavy and 
bureaucratic’.19 It was also suggested that because socio-economic 
development was inevitably complex, with often unclear causal pathways, 
indicator measures might not always be valuable. Above all, the review argued 
that there was a ‘mismatch’ between the aspiration for global development and 
the material contribution that Oxfam can provide, a tension that ‘has been a 
difficult experience for many staff, who have found it impossible to abandon 
their claims to be working effectively on so many levels and in many different 
ways’ (on similar themes, see Smillie 1995).20 
 
Despite these criticisms, as the 1990s advanced, the managerial train 
continued to make inroads into Oxfam GB. In the second half of the decade, 
following the establishment of Oxfam International and the formalisation of a 
Strategic Plan (covering 1996 to 2000), discussion of MEL-related activities 
picked up steam, involving further reports, meetings, and workshops on the 
subject.21 By 1998, Oxfam International had moved to create ‘Program 
 
15 Now rebranded as Compass Partnership, the group continues to specialise in management 
consultancy services to voluntary and nonprofit organisations.  
16 Tina Wallace and Tony Burdon, ‘Strategic Planning Review’, Planning and Evaluation Unit, 
June 1993, 75. (PRG/8/3/7/12, Oxfam Archive, Weston Library, University of Oxford). 
17 Ibid., 10. 
18 Ibid., 13, 17. 
19 Ibid., 13. 
20 Ibid., 70. 
21 For example, see Chris Roche, ‘Institutional Learning in Oxfam; Some Thoughts’, October 
18, 1995. (PRG/8/3/7/10, Oxfam Archive, Weston Library, University of Oxford). Also see 
Oxfam-UK/Ireland, ‘Programme Officers’ Workshop’, February 25-March 2, 1996, Bali, 
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Management Standards’, a framework which proposed guidelines for how all 
affiliates could conduct their MEL work.22 More generally, we also see 
increased use of external consultants, along with the circulation of reading 
materials that, in part, drew upon management theory as a source of 
inspiration.23 Chris Roche, who led such debates at the time, argued: ‘In the 
late 1990s, there was a feeling that if Oxfam was going to remain relevant, it 
had to engage with these debates on learning. There was increasing pressure 
to communicate what the group was actually achieving’.24 At the same time, the 
logframe approach, highlighted earlier as a classic performance management 
device in the tradition of rational linear planning, was becoming embedded in 
Oxfam GB’s projects, notably to satisfy ‘upward accountability’ demands to 
DFID. Although criticism of the logframe was pronounced in activist circles, the 
justification for it often proceeded through references to its presumed ‘technical’ 
and ‘objective’ quality (Gasper 2000). As one former Oxfam staffer expressed 
it, ‘I remember my bosses saying that the logframe was “just a management 
tool”. Don’t worry about it, they would say. But I was saying: no, it carries 
implications and reshapes the way you think about this world. You can’t think 
holistically in these fragmented boxes.’25 (also see Wallace 1997). 
 
How can we summarise this phase of embryonic managerialism in Oxfam GB 
and which factors proved most important for encouraging the early 
development of MEL? At one level, it is important to appreciate how the early 
thinking around MEL was motivated by a genuine concern to improve 
operations and not simply a reflection of following the dictates of higher powers 
or, more insidiously, being ‘hoodwinked’ by managerial ideas. Lack of clarity on 
goals, knowledge deficiencies, and problems learning from past projects were 
serious worries for many Oxfam GB staff. Even the logframe had its supporters 
who noted its potential for sharpening the purpose of an intervention. This 
internal dialogue, centred around the desire for professionalised effectiveness, 
was probably the key catalyst for why MEL was programmatically constructed. 
To further such ends, I note the particular significance of private consultants 
who, as seen in other public and private organisations, planted and stimulated 
managerial thinking within the group. Such activity was important for catching 
the ear of senior executives who had the authority to reshape the internal 
organisation of Oxfam GB and, in turn, eventually grant MEL a more secure 
institutional status. Other channels of external pressure, such as from the UK 
government, were less important at this time although, by the late 1990s with 
 
Indonesia,  Report on Process and Outcomes. (PRG/8/3/7/10, Oxfam Archive, Weston Library, 
University of Oxford).  
22 Oxfam International, ‘Program Management Standards’, Final Report, November 24, 1998. 
(PRG/8/3/7/10, Oxfam Archive, Weston Library, University of Oxford).  
23 For instance, see in particular ‘Preparation for the Proposed Strategic Management Project’ 
(1997). (PRG/8/3/7/19, Oxfam Archive, Weston Library, University of Oxford). This document 
lists consultants who have provided, or could assist, Oxfam GB on strategic management. Also 
included are reading lists featuring management theory authors (such as Charles Handy, Tom 
Peters, and Gareth Morgan); literature applying management ideas to the public sector (such 
as David Osborne and Ted Gaebler); as well as highlights from the emerging field of 
development management (such as Alan Fowler). It is admittedly unclear to know how these 
readings were consulted. 
24 Chris Roche, Former Programme Development Team Leader, Oxfam GB (1994-2002), 
online interview with author, October 4, 2017.  
25 Tina Wallace, Former Advisor to Oxfam, interview with author, Oxford, October 17, 2017.  
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the founding of DFID, managerial practices linked to funding were becoming 
increasingly common and would assume greater significance. 
 
In his discussion of managerialism as a particular form of ideology and 
organisational conduct, Martin Parker (2002) has argued that one can be pro-
organisation, in a core sense of wanting to classify social existence and shape 
its institutional forms, at the same time as being anti-managerial (also see Grey 
2017). Yet the difficulty of observing (or forecasting) this distinction lies in 
knowing when ‘mere organisational improvement’ segues into ‘excessive 
managerialism’, the latter of which could feature negative social implications. 
This leads to a deeper behavioural pattern for why MEL tended to diffuse – one 
which reprises a core theme of my overall argument – around the ‘optimistic’ 
allure of managerial vocabulary in a seemingly unmanageable world. Here, we 
see how managerialism dovetails with the larger ideological content of 
liberalism when it appeals to the potential improvability of institutions and, in 
turn, how ‘advancing progress’ can help to inspire commitment. As documented 
elsewhere in this special issue, by gesturing to seemingly incontestable 
objectives such as organisational improvement, and promoting simplified 
models as a way to address common problems, managerialism has a tendency 
to creep into a wide variety of institutional spaces (including domains that may 
be initially hostile to such ideas). The embryonic managerialism of MEL in 
Oxfam GB did not need to convince all agents within the group but, when such 
agendas had established a foothold, it made it easier to intensify managerial 
practices, the recent history of which we can now turn. 
 
Mature managerialism  
 
To recall the wider context discussed in the previous section, from the early 
2000s, the major international organisations and OECD governments were 
strongly promoting the desirability of results-based management for all actors 
in the development system (OECD 2000; Kusek and Rist 2004; Valters and 
Whitty 2017). As part of the first DFID PPA Agreement with Oxfam (2001-05), 
which was subsequently renewed until 2016, investment in MEL systems was 
encouraged (Oxfam 2006).26 Partly in response to this pressure, but also 
reflecting the aforementioned internal motivations, we witness a gradual 
normalisation of MEL-related work in Oxfam GB. In the context of a Strategic 
Plan for Oxfam International (2001-06), and upon the direction of the Executive 
Board, a newly designed MEL team was created.27 By this stage, MEL was 
defined as a ‘key function of management’. Among various activities, a 
workshop was held where McKinsey & Company was invited to discuss 
 
26 From DFID’s perspective, strong MEL policies in Oxfam GB were needed to assess the value 
of PPA grants in relation to DFID’s own universe of stakeholders (HM Treasury, Prime 
Minister’s Office etc.). In this regard, the logframe remained the principal tool for monitoring 
performance, along with annual self-assessment reviews, independent performance reviews 
(led by external experts), and mid-term and end-of-project reviews. 
27 Oxfam International, ‘Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning in a Confederative Context; 
Preliminary Action Plan for the MEL Team’, January 24, 2001. (PRG/8/3/7/9, Oxfam Archive, 
Weston Library, University of Oxford). At this point, the other affiliates involved with Oxfam GB 
were Oxfam America, Oxfam Australia, Oxfam Intermón (Spain), and Oxfam Novib 
(Netherlands), along with five other Oxfam International staff.  
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success stories of MEL processes from the corporate world.28 By 2002, a more 
ambitious MEL framework was proposed.29 Among major aims, it speaks of the 
need to ‘minimise transaction costs’, and cultivate the ‘right incentives and 
culture for organisational learning based on competencies and performance 
management’.30 There is a particular concern with trying to marry the interests 
of donors, who adopt what is labeled an ‘input-output-impact chain’ method, 
with ‘contextual’ evidence that is closer to the lived experiences of the poor.31 
The new framework calls for avoiding an overly bureaucratic approach and to 
place as much emphasis on ‘learning by doing’ as on planning. 
 
From 2006, Oxfam GB and Oxfam International markedly increased activity 
around the subject of accountability. This included committing to international 
standards with other major INGOs, such as the Global Reporting Initiative and 
the International Non-Governmental Organisations Accountability Charter, 
creating in the process a voluntary, peer-based, mutual surveillance 
mechanism (Crack 2018a).32 In 2007, Oxfam GB began publishing an annual 
Accountability Review which, by 2015, was superseded by a single Oxfam-wide 
Accountability Report. As explained in the broader sector, Oxfam GB has faced 
reoccurring problems not only in trying to adequately respond to ‘multiple 
accountabilities’, but in a manner which demonstrates ‘rigorous’ evaluation. In 
2011, led by an expanding MEL unit, Oxfam GB launched a Global 
Performance Framework (GPF) in an effort both to assess whether 
interventions were making a meaningful difference (the learning aspect), and 
to summarise data across the group into communicable forms for different 
audiences (the accountability aspect). The GPF features two elements: 
Effectiveness Reviews, which target particular projects (by the end of 2017, 
over 100 had been conducted), and a Global Output Report which tries to 
aggregate the entire impact of Oxfam GB’s work, primarily for reporting 
requirements with senior management and donors (Hutchings 2014). Among 
notable features of this effort to make MEL part of everyday conduct, one can 
highlight how it sparked debate on what constitutes rigour and evidence, how 
to assess causality, and the particular role of quantitative methods. As the 
current Head of Programme Quality has expressed it, ‘The accountability 
culture isn’t going away. Oxfam GB purposefully overswung in the direction of 
 
28 McKinsey & Company, ‘Monitoring and Evaluation in a Global Confederation; MELT 
Workshop – Corporate Case Studies’, May 29, 2001. (PRG/8/3/7/9, Oxfam Archive, Weston 
Library, University of Oxford). In addition, one can also note how, from 2005, Accenture 
established a partnership with Oxfam GB to provide advisory services on various projects. See: 
https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/PDF-25/Accenture-Oxfam-Credential.pdf 
29 Oxfam GB ‘Framework for Monitoring, Evaluation and Knowledge Management’, April 2002. 
(PRG/8/3/7/9, Oxfam Archive, Weston Library, University of Oxford). 
30 Ibid., 4. 
31 Ibid., 4. 
32 For the archive of relevant reports, see: https://www.oxfam.org.uk/what-we-do/about-
us/plans-reports-and-policies/plans-reports-and-policies-archive. In 2016, the INGO 
Accountability Charter changed its name to Accountable Now. See: 
https://accountablenow.org/. Within the Charter, there is a section on ‘Professional 
Management’. On Oxfam’s relations through Accountable Now, see: 
https://accountablenow.org/accountability-in-practice/accountability-reports/oxfam-
international/. These types of arrangement have also been referred to as ‘accountability clubs’, 
defined as voluntary, rule-based governance systems created and sponsored by NGO actors. 
See Gugerty and Prakash (2010). 
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more quantitative evaluation, partly to show that NGOs could “do numbers” and 
it makes for easier dialogue with donors, but also because it genuinely helps to 
improve qualitative understanding in our work’.33 
 
I would suggest here that an advanced form of managerialism has now 
stamped its mark upon how MEL has been conceived and conducted within 
Oxfam GB. Again, however, this has not entailed a uniform acceptance of some 
unchanging, rational, managerial vision. The critique of managerialism is long-
standing within the political economy of development. This pattern continues 
today within conversations among INGOs and researchers who have 
problematised and, in cases, strongly rebuked, results-based management 
frameworks (Roche and Kelly 2012; Eyben et al. 2015; Shutt 2016).34 Many of 
these ideas coalesce under the new heading of ‘adaptive management’, an 
orientation which involves acknowledging the inherent problem of uncertainty 
and complexity in the practice of development by going beyond ‘linear, 
mechanistic’ thinking and focusing on ‘course-corrections’ within policymaking 
(Bond 2016: 3; also see Desai et al. 2018). In MEL-related dialogues, the 
adaptive management approach tends to feature references to ‘adaptable 
logframes’ and ‘theories of change’; how ‘power matters’; the need for ‘greater 
reflexivity’; and not to confuse ‘vanity metrics’ with ‘real social change’.35 It is 
noteworthy that Oxfam GB has been participating in such debates and, 
moreover, that some critical voices within DFID, but also elsewhere (such as 
USAID), have also responded sympathetically to the messier reality that 
adaptive management claims to capture (Green 2016, 2018; Bond 2016). 
Indeed, it now appears that adaptive management is not simply a ‘passing fad’, 
but has a potentially longer life in the policy world (Green 2019). 
 
Two points can help to shed additional light on this case. First, to draw upon 
Weber (2013[1922]), I would suggest that MEL-related activity in Oxfam GB 
reveals an ongoing tension between instrumental and value forms of rationality. 
Reflective of a bureaucratic mentality, which reveals its lineage with the state 
and the corporation, the tendency of MEL systems is to gravitate towards the 
formal, calculating, means-end rationality. In promoting such practices, MEL is 
essentially preoccupied with surveillance and how to regularise organisational 
behaviour and, via this dynamic, I would argue that the instrumental form of 
rationality remains the strongest influence. But the appeal to the ethical or 
substantive dimension of rationality is often needed to justify or, at the very 
least, encourage tolerance for such activity, as seen in the increasing 
intellectual appeal to ‘complexity’ and ‘non-linearity’, or explaining more 
precisely how MEL produces tangible benefits for marginalised populations. 
Together, it could be argued that the instrumental and value modes of 
 
33 Claire Hutchings, Head of Programme Quality, Oxfam GB, interview with author, Oxford, 
August 30, 2017. 
34 Three notable networks of activity are: (1) ‘The Big Push Forward’, which developed from 
2010, led by Rosalind Eyben and Irene Guijt, among others; (2) ‘Thinking and Working 
Politically’, which emerged from 2011, involving donor officials and leading practitioners; and 
(3) ‘Doing Development Differently’, an initiative that was formed in 2014, organised by the 
Overseas Development Institute, among others. 
35 Lindsay McColl, Performance Effectiveness Manager, Oxfam GB, Glasgow; and Marie-Lisa 
Burrough, Monitoring and Evaluation Adviser for Campaigns, Oxfam GB, Oxford, online 
interview with author, September 1, 2017. 
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managerial rationality represent a ‘double bind’ for Oxfam GB practitioners who 
are caught trying to reconcile the multiple interests and historical discourses 
associated with each form (Mitchell 2016). Nonetheless, the adaptive 
management turn can be read as a way in which certain activists have tried to 
craft a conversation which deepens the exploration of messy politics. It remains 
to be seen if such work will lead to a form of managerial rationality in INGOs 
which is more distinctive from the managerial technologies emanating from 
governments and IOs within the development industry.  
 
Second, and in keeping with my larger argument, this potential reconciliation 
process is, in turn, symptomatic of a need to be seen to be in control. Elaborate 
performance systems and the demand for ‘quick deliverables’ point to an 
anxiety about uncertainty and blame avoidance, yet a reluctance to critically 
explore the unpredictability and unknowability of power (Power 2004; Hood 
2010). As critics have noted following the sexual abuse scandal at Oxfam from 
2018, INGOs are increasingly encouraged to present to donors and other 
audiences an ‘impossibly immaculate account of success’, one which 
suppresses internal disputes, knowledge gaps, and injustices in their midst 
(Crack 2018b). To fill this sense of lack and uncertainty, managerialism enters 
as a deceptively ‘hopeful’ solution to the problem of control and precision, 
complete with readymade military and industrial metaphors which are housed 
within a system of historical meanings. Yet users frequently expect too much 
from managerialism and, therefore, it is no surprise that when disappointments 
and setbacks strike, new revisions to the managerial calculus ensue. 
Understanding why and how managerialism has become normalised in the 
social space of international development thus requires not only inspecting 
relevant institutional histories, but also the major cultural meanings within the 





Within IPE, a substantial body of literature has coalesced around understanding 
the activities of non-state actors in the world economy. To conceptually 
categorise and empirically probe the behaviour of such players, IPE scholars 
have tended to make use of professionalisation and neoliberalisation as 
explanatory anchors. While offering some informative insights into the 
behaviour of such agents, these contributions have neglected how powerful 
ideas and practices tied to managerialism now serve as a significant source of 
motivational stimuli for large INGOs. This article has responded to this lacuna 
by making three main contributions. First, the argument has sought inspiration 
from the productive field of critical management studies in order to furnish an 
examination of managerialism which foregrounds the enduring problems of 
rationality and control in organisations. My argument has explored why the 
justification for abstract managerialism radiates an attractive aura for many and 
yet, at the same time, the concrete governance of managerialism is often beset 
with criticisms, tensions, and contradictions. At a normative level, the article has 
not claimed that seeking an efficient organisation is, in a basic sense, somehow 
inherently suspicious, but my argument has critiqued how managerialism, as a 
particular form of organising, contains potentially regressive properties, 
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particularly around the overemphasis on instrumental rationality at the expense 
of other forms of human expression. 
 
Second, via an application to the field of global development policy, I have 
plotted the key macro explanations for why managerialism, as a set of social 
technologies, has become intertwined into the conduct of major INGOs. 
Mapping this multicausal process helps to reveal how managerial ideology has 
a degree of suppleness, notably with respect to incorporating into its purview 
those interests who have historically resisted the managerial vision. Through 
new primary data, the case study on Oxfam GB has uncovered how MEL 
agendas, imprinted with the managerial stamp, moved from being a marginal 
activity to a central preoccupation of the group. In one sense, this empirical 
story shows a process of major INGOs ‘catching up’ with managerial trends that 
have advanced within other corporate and political domains. But it also sheds 
light on the peculiarities of this encounter and the individuals who have 
struggled to make sense of the merging (or clashing) of the world of advocacy 
with the world of management. My argument is that one can use the Oxfam 
case as a comparison with similar trends in other large INGOs, such as 
Greenpeace, CARE, or Amnesty International. Thus, the generalisability from 
this case is most suitable in relation to those internationally active players that 
have ties with multiple funders and other stakeholders. The extent to which 
MEL agendas have penetrated into small or medium-sized NGOs is, however, 
an open question which would require further investigation.  
 
In keeping with the aims set out in the Introduction to this special issue, if this 
case was only explained through the prism of the neoliberalisation of civil 
society, one would miss salient features of the managerial ethic. I argue that 
once managerialism is embedded within an institutional culture and the 
dispositional conduct of certain individuals, it offers a malleable set of social 
technologies for control. This desire for control – which is often illusory and 
fleeting as much as substantive and enduring – may be directed towards 
commodification (a la the neoliberal spirit), but in the case of Oxfam reflects a 
more pervasive anxiety about institutional comportment and how to appear to 
others as a ‘modern’ organisation. In this sense, when managerialism becomes 
part of the mainstream grammar and is made organisationally durable over time 
(particularly via financial needs), it becomes difficult to dislodge. This is not to 
disregard how, for instance, adaptive management has drawn more 
complicated intellectual pictures, yet I argue that these debates are still 
epistemologically housed within the managerial vision. Dovetailing with other 
contributions to this special issue (Seabrooke and Sending, Soederberg and 
Sharma), I also suggest that the focus on managerialism helps to sharpen our 
spotlight on agents who can pass underexamined in discussions on the world 
economy, such as consultants, senior managers, or compliance staff – all key 
players doing the labour of ‘selling’ managerialism.  
 
The third and wider contribution represents a call for IPE to complement its 
structuralist analysis of INGOs within the world economy with more contextual, 
agential, behind-the-scenes case studies. Undoubtedly, INGOs like Oxfam GB 
are constrained when they mimic dominant organisational design. By seeking 
to retain an international policy relevant status, such players had limited scope 
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to seriously deviate from managerial trends which were simultaneously 
becoming entrenched in other powerful institutions. But external structuring as 
a source of change within INGOs does not account for the entire story. Indeed, 
the meaning of ‘agency’ in relation to INGOs and managerialism provokes a 
range of reactions and experiences. I have suggested, for instance, that MEL 
was read by some as a liberating development when compared to orthodox 
internal cultures that were judged to be inadequate. In light of the recent Oxfam 
sexual misconduct scandal, we saw again how principles tied to MEL activity, 
notably transparency, were reactivated and forcefully promoted as the 
organisation struggled to handle the crisis.36 This is to suggest, therefore, that 
managerialism can be strategically appropriated by INGOs to serve objectives 
that carry a wider socio-political purpose. Yet it still remains difficult to perceive 
the tipping points when a normatively desirable organisational enhancement 
segues, often via incremental and deceptively apolitical reforms, into the 
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